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A. Conflicts Arising When Maximization and Allocation are
Connected






Academic commentators recognize that state bar ethics rules cannot
regulate lawyers' responsibilities in class actions as they do in other
contexts.' This conclusion holds partly because class actions are subject to
due process constraints.2 Due process requires conflict minimization, and
state bar rules sometimes create conflicts needlessly. Judges must ignore
* Co-Director. Center on Lawyers, Civil Justice, and the Media and Cecil D. Redford Professor,
University of Texas School of Law.
1. Charles Silver. Due Process and the Lodestar Method: You Can't Get There From Here, 74
TUL. L. REv. 1809, 1829-31 (2000) (stating that the state bar rules "were not designed with class
litigation in mind . . . and are poorly suited to the special problems that class actions present"); see
also John C. Coffee, Jr., Kutak Symposium, Professional Responsibility and the Corporate Lawyer,
13 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHIcs 331. 340 (2000) (observing that "the usual rules of legal ethics simply
cannot apply to the class action context.").
2. See Silver, supra note 1, at 1827.
state bar rules when this occurs.3 By doing otherwise, they would saddle
absent plaintiffs with inadequate representation.4
The conclusion that traditional approaches to lawyer regulation fail in
class actions also reflects the reality that lawyers and class members do not
relate to each other as lawyers and clients typically do. As Professor John C.
Coffee, Jr. states:
Courts have been repeatedly saying.., that the usual rules of legal
ethics simply cannot apply to the class-action context .... The key
reason ... is that the relationship between attorney and client is
totally different in the class-action setting.
All traditional legal ethics is founded upon an idea of the attorney as
agent and once you are an agent, you have an established body of
law, the Restatement of Agency, that tells you fidelity, loyalty,
everything you would expect of a fiduciary applies....
However, in the class action, the plaintiff's attorney is not simply an
agent; the attorney is also the financier of the class action. The
attorney puts up the litigation expenses and[,] in the typical class
action, that amounts to as much as several million dollars. What's
more, the attorney is not just a creditor; the attorney is a joint-
venturer because the attorney's economic return will likely be...
thirty percent of the total settlement before expenses.... We have
a world in which the attorney is simultaneously creditor, joint-
venturer, and agent of the class, and that means the rules of legal
ethics, which assume that the attorney is exclusively an agent, are
really quite different. And, to take these multiple relationships and
say that the rules of princip[al] and agent determine everything, is
really only possible by stuffing the square peg into the round hole.
You can stuff square pegs into round holes, but you do it with brute
force and not with elegance. 5
Coffee's argument draws on the economic or structural features of class
actions.6 Consequently, it applies with equal force to other representations
that differ from traditional attorney-client relationships in the identified
ways. 7 Mass tort representations, including multi-plaintiff asbestos lawsuits,
3. Id. at 1820, 1832 ("The Due Process Clause requires [judges] to minimize conflicts between
absent claimants and their representatives.").
4. Id. For example, even though contingent percentage compensation arrangements minimize
conflicts between class members and their attorneys, judges often refuse to use them on the ground
that they yield effective hourly rates higher than state bar rules allow. Id. Judges thus build
avoidable conflicts into class actions, denying class members due process of law.
5. Coffee, supra note 1, at 340-341.
6. Id.
7. See, e.g., Charles Silver & Lynn A. Baker, I Cut, You Choose: The Role of Plaintiffs'
Counsel in Allocating Settlement Proceeds, 84 VA. L. REV. 1465 (1998) (arguing that consensual
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fit Coffee's description. The plaintiffs' attorneys provide crucial financing.8
Therefore, like class action lawyers, they are claimants' creditors. They earn
contingent fees in the range of thirty to forty percent. Therefore, like class
action lawyers, they are joint venturers with claimants. And they are agents
with fiduciary duties. Therefore, like class action lawyers, they owe
claimants loyalty. Coffee says it is "stuffing the square peg into the round
hole" to use the rules of agency to handle all issues when these diverse
relationships combine. If this is true for class action lawyers, it is true for
mass tort lawyers as well.9
This article will argue that mass tort lawyers occupy two roles with
differing and somewhat conflicting responsibilities. Sometimes, they are
agents who must benefit their clients and operate subject to their clients'
control. Other times, they are trustees and must figure out what is
reasonable for their charges. The latter assignment entails a degree of
paternalism and a degree of freedom to act disloyally, both of which are
foreign to agency. Subjecting mass tort lawyers to agency rules exclusively
obscures and distorts the latter role, which lawyers must play if group
representations are to succeed.
Forcing square pegs into round holes also creates an intolerable situation
in which a lawyer who merely wishes to do what is right when settling a
mass tort representation can find no clear path under the rules.' 0 I often
receive requests for assistance from lawyers who, being on the brink of
negotiating or having already negotiated enormous settlements, see the
process of finalizing deals as an ethical minefield. This is not as it should
be. The default rules of agency and professional responsibility should create
clear signposts that lawyers can follow when settling multiple-client
representations and that, if followed, insulate lawyers from liability.
This article will argue for a richer normative account of mass tort
lawyering in the following way. Part II will show that the project of
maximizing claim values can be rife with conflicts. Because this project is
usually thought to be a harmonious one that agency law and state bar rules
group lawsuits can serve as models for class action because "[flrom an economic perspective,
litigation groups in both realms look much the same except for their manner of creation.").
8. Coffee, supra note 1, at 341 (stating that, in class actions, "the attorney is also the financier"
by "put[ting] up the litigation expenses").
9. By starting with class actions and ending with consensual group lawsuits, I reverse my usual
manner of proceeding. See Charles Silver & Lynn A. Baker, supra note 7 (arguing that consensual
group lawsuits can serve as models for class actions). I do so simply because Professor Coffee's
subject was the class action. Generally, I think consensual litigation groups function better than
class actions because they rely on contractual private orderings rather than judicial regulation.
Howard Erichson takes the opposite tack, writing that "it makes sense to take some of the strongest
ideas from the class action literature and case law and examine whether those ideas can sensibly be
applied to address some of these problems in non-class collective representation." Howard M.
Erichson, Beyond the Class Action: Lawyer Loyalty, and Client Autonomy in Non-Class Collective
Representation, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 7 (forthcoming 2003).
10. Coffee, supra note 1, at 341.
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permit lawyers to undertake, one must conclude that these bodies of law
have considerable tolerance for conflicts built in. Part III will focus on the
project of allocating recoveries. It will argue that although this project
entails unavoidable conflicts, plaintiffs' lawyers make valuable contributions
to it, akin to the contributions trustees make by allocating assets among
beneficiaries impartially and reasonably. In practical effect, the point of
requiring conflict waivers is to allow lawyers to act as trustees when
designing allocation plans. Finally, Part IV will argue that misplaced
attachment to agency and state bar rules prevents clients from regulating
mass tort representations in ways that further their interests. Default rules of
agency and ethics are supposed to help clients, not harm them. Clients
should therefore be free to deviate from these rules when they want. In
particular, they should be free to create fiduciary relationships that cast
lawyers in hybrid roles that allow lawyers to make inter-client trade offs.
II. MAXIMIZATION CONFLICTS
A mass tort representation requires a lawyer to perform two tasks:
maximize the value of a block of claims; and allocate the recovery among
the claimants or, at least, recommend an allocation subject to client
approval. The first task is commonly thought to be a harmonious
undertaking; the second, to be fraught with conflicts.
Value maximization seems conflict-free. Contractual contingent fee
arrangements motivate plaintiffs' attorneys to prefer larger recoveries to
smaller ones, and increasing the size of the pie has the potential to make
everyone better off. A larger pie facilitates Paretian improvements, i.e.,
moves from State One to State Two that help some clients (and possibly all
clients) without harming any." This is an "in principle" point. Given any
possible allocation of the expected recovery for a group as a starting point
(State One), a larger recovery enables one to achieve a different allocation
(State Two) in which at least one client is better off and no client is worse
off. Increasing the recovery therefore seems unambiguously to be a step a
lawyer can take without being disloyal to anyone.
I do not deny that plaintiffs' lawyers should seek to maximize recoveries
for claimant groups. This is the goal clients typically want lawyers to seek
ex ante and which they use level contingent percentage fee agreements to
encourage lawyers to pursue.12  However, the simple and harmonious
account of claim maximization just presented is unduly sanguine. It requires
an important factual assumption that is often incorrect, and it hides conflicts
that can arise when the transition from State One to State Two requires a
series of moves.
1I. For an excellent recent summary of Paretianism and its strengths and weaknesses, see Jules
L. Coleman, The Grounds of Welfare, 112 YALE L.J. 1511, 1515-20 (forthcoming 2003) (reviewing
Louis KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE (2002)).
12. This point is explained more fully in Part III, infro.
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A. Conflicts Arising When Maximization and Allocation are Connected
The factual assumption required by the simple account is that strategies
for maximizing claim values do not prejudice possible allocations of
recovered funds. To see this, consider two possibilities. Maximization
Strategy I yields an expected recovery of $300 that must be divided among
Clients A, B, and C equally, so that each receives $100. Maximization
Strategy Two yields a larger expected recovery, $330, but it must be divided
$90 to A, $90 to B, and $150 to C. Strategy Two increases the recovery for
the group (and a uniform contingent fee arrangement would encourage a
lawyer to select Strategy Two for this reason), but it also disadvantages
Clients A and B. Strategy One serves them better by giving them larger
shares of a smaller gross recovery.
In this example, the move from Strategy One to Strategy Two is a
potential Pareto improvement known as a Kaldor-Hicks improvement, but
not an actual Pareto improvement. 3 To make Strategy Two Pareto superior
to Strategy One, one would have to take an amount between $20 and $50
from C and split it between A and B, with each receiving at least $10. One
would then have an allocation in which no client receives less than $100 (the
expected payoff for each client generated by Strategy One) and at least one
client receives more.
Because it is easy to move money, the difference between an actual
Pareto improvement and a potential Pareto improvement may seem to be of
academic interest. A plaintiffs' attorney can select Strategy Two, increase
the size of the pie, and reallocate the proceeds so that no client suffers.'4
Yet, the assumption that one can maximize now and assign shares later need
not be true. Maximization and allocation can be linked in ways that allow
Kaldor-Hicks improvements but not Pareto-superior moves.
Sometimes money comes with strings. Instead of settling for a lump
sum that can be allocated freely, a defendant may offer individualized
payments. In the example just given, the "$100 each" allocation may be the
defendant's "out of the box" settlement offer, and the "$90, $90, $150"
allocation may be an expected second offer made after both sides have taken
discovery and more carefully assessed the merits. If the defendant will not
permit a reallocation (e.g., because it faces thousands of lawsuits and does
not want a reputation for overpaying on weak claims) by pursuing Strategy
Two, a plaintiffs attorney would maximize the value of the group of claims
but would also make two clients worse off than they would have been under
Strategy One.
Jury verdicts are also sources of strings. Because jury awards liquidate
individual claims, maximization and allocation are connected when
13. Coleman, supra note I1, at 1517-19.
14. Reallocation may raise loyalty issues. See infra, Part Ill.
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maximization involves going to trial. A lawyer cannot simply take part of a
jury's award to Client A and give it to Client B. This feature of jury awards
may even account for a defendant's decision to shift from the first allocation
plan to the second when offering settlement dollars, on the usual theory that
settlement offers reflect outcomes expected at trial.
Plaintiffs' attorneys have tried many asbestos cases, and some trials
have yielded spectacular verdicts. Plaintiffs who might have received tens
or hundreds of thousands of dollars in settlements have won millions of
dollars in trials. 5 Tried cases may return substantially more than settled
cases. 
16
Trial victories motivate defendants to settle, but they can also create
allocation problems, problems insolvencies among asbestos manufacturers
have brought to the fore. If a small number of plaintiffs with enormous jury
verdicts were paid in full, other plaintiffs might receive next to nothing,
perhaps even less than they would have recovered had the trials turned out
less favorably. Trial victories may cause a defendant to be more generous
on the whole, but not all plaintiffs may benefit from a larger gross payment
on a block of claims.
For example, suppose a defendant would offer $50 million to settle a
block of one thousand asbestos claims. Now suppose that a plaintiffs'
attorney decides to exert greater pressure on the defendant by trying five
claims. The trials turn out well and the five plaintiffs win $50 million.
While the verdicts are on appeal, the defendant offers $80 million to settle
the group. The strategy of increasing the pressure has paid off, generating a
$30 million increase in the size of the fund. Yet, if the five victorious
plaintiffs were paid the full $50 million on their jury verdicts, the remaining
995 claimants would have to share only $30 million. Assuming that the five
victorious claimants would have received less than $20 million out of the
original $50 million offer, the $80 million settlement would necessarily
leave some of the remaining claimants worse off. To achieve a Pareto
improvement, the five victorious plaintiffs would have to accept amounts
below their verdicts when settling.'7
Because jury awards in asbestos cases may exceed settlement payments
by far, the process of selecting cases for trial also raises concerns. Suppose
a lawyer has one thousand clients with asbestos claims against a recalcitrant
defendant. Now suppose a trial setting opens up and the lawyer wants to use
it to generate pressure to settle. By standing order of the court, the lawyer
can select any five claimants with pending cases and try them. The five
15. JAMES S. KAKALIK ET AL., RAND INSTITUTE FOR CIVIL JUSTICE VARIATION IN ASBESTOS
LITIGATION COMPENSATION AND EXPENSES xviii fig.S.1 (1984) (comparing returns in tried and
settled asbestos cases). Settlement discounts occur in many kinds of lawsuits. See, e.g., Stephen J.
Spurr & Walter 0. Simmons, Medical Malpractice in Michigan: An Economic Analysis 21 J.
HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 315, 316 (1996) (finding that medical malpractice cases settle for
"approximately 16 to 20 percent less ... than the expected value of... claims in litigation").
16. Id.
17. Substantial discounts on the jury verdicts might be appropriate, for example, if the verdicts
were likely to be reversed or reduced on appeal. The point is not that discounts are wrong, but that
discounts must occur to achieve Pareto improvements.
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clients chosen will receive one lottery ticket; the 995 clients not chosen will
receive another. The lotteries are connected, the outcome of the second
varying with the outcome of the first, but the risks and rewards differ
enormously. A trial victory could make the five chosen clients rich, while
making the remaining clients only somewhat better off (and perhaps even
worse off in limited fund contexts). A trial loss would devastate the five
chosen clients while harming the remaining 995 clients less significantly.
In my experience, a lawyer in the situation described will look for the
best five cases to try, where "best" means having the highest expected value
at trial. There is an obvious sense in which these are the cases the lawyer
should select. Trying the five best cases will subject the defendant to the
maximum amount of settlement pressure, raising the expected value of the
entire block of claims to its highest point. However, the remaining 995
clients may not be satisfied knowing this. Each may prefer an opportunity to
win big at trial to the option of remaining in the pack, even while
acknowledging that another's case is superior.
18
The possibility that a lawyer's judgment concerning the order of trying
claims may conflict with a client's wishes materialized in the Bendectin
litigation. Discussing the case of Betty Mekdeci, the first Bendectin plaintiff
to go to trial, Professor Howard Erichson writes:
After the first jury found against her, a new trial was granted on
appeal. Mekdeci's lawyers considered her case more problematic
than some others, and wanted to postpone the retrial to allow other
cases to go to trial first. When Mekdeci refused to postpone her
trial, the lawyers unsuccessfully tried to withdraw from representing
her. "
Erichson then reports the judgment of Professor Richard Marcus that
"Mekdeci's case provides some reason for feeling that client desires may
legitimately be conditioned on the 'greater good' of the overall plaintiff
18. Obviously, this statement assumes that clients know about their own claims and others'. In
an interesting paper on class actions, Geoffrey Miller proposes a Rawlsian approach to handling
conflicts that assumes ignorance of claimant-specific information. On Miller's approach, "a conflict
of interest should be deemed impermissible if a reasonable plaintiff, operating under a veil of
ignorance as to his or her role in the class, would refuse consent to the arrangement." Geoffrey
Miller, Conflicts of Interest in Class Action Litigation: An Inquiry into the Appropriate Standard 2
(2003) (unpublished article on file with the author). Essentially. this is a "reasonable plaintiff'
standard, the merit of which is that decisions on conflicts would be made in a rational and risk
neutral way with the object of maximizing the expected value of claims. Id. at 11-12. The thrust of
this article is similar. In consensual group lawsuits, strategy choices that are reasonably predicted to
maximize aggregate claim values are normatively proper and desirable even when they involve
inter-client tradeoffs like the one discussed in the text.
19. Erichson. supra note 9, at 30 n.132 (citing Mekdeci v. Merrell Nat'l Lab.. 711 F.2d 1510,
1516 (11 th Cir. 1983); MICHAEL GREEN, BENDECTIN AND BIRTH DEFECTS: THE CHALLENGES OF
MASS Toxic SUBSTANCES LITIGATION (1996)).
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group in some litigations involving multiple claimants., 2 0 Erichson endorses
this assessment.2'
I agree that the good of all may reasonably come before the good of any.
However, my point here is the weaker descriptive one that, in group
lawsuits, trial verdicts and strategic litigation decisions relating to them can
create inter-client conflicts even when everyone agrees on the aggregate
value-maximizing choice. The process of maximizing the value of a group
of claims need not be conflict-free. The example involving Mekdeci makes
this clear.
Maximization strategies can also affect allocations when claims are
expected to settle and when defendants care little about the manner in which
settlement dollars are deployed. Suppose cash flow considerations lead an
asbestos defendant to agree to pay one hundred cases at pre-set values every
six months, with the intent of resolving a plaintiff's attorney's inventory of
one thousand cases over five years. Now assume that all claimants with the
same diseases are to be paid the same amount, with no adjustment for delay.
Rationally, every claimant would want to be in the first settlement group, a
dollar received today being worth more than a dollar received in the future.
But only one hundred claimants can be in the first group; some payments
must be delayed. The staggered settlement may maximize the total payout
(even when delay is accounted for), but plaintiffs with late-processed claims
may have a grievance.
In principle, a cash flow deal can leave open all possible orders of
processing claims. In the example, claims one through one hundred could
be processed first. So could claims 900 through 1000 and all other
combinations of one hundred claims. The decision to negotiate a cash flow
deal, therefore, need not place any particular client behind any other in the
payment queue. It does require the lawyer to order the clients at some point,
however, and therein lays the difficulty. Some clients must be paid last, and
they might have preferred a different settlement that would have yielded less
money but paid them sooner.
For example, suppose the cash flow deal had a net present value of $100
million and that the one thousandth Client would have received $10,000 in
year five. Now suppose the plaintiffs' attorney had a second option:22 force
the defendant into involuntary bankruptcy. Assume that, had the second
option been chosen, Client 1000 would have received $8,000 in year three.
If Client 1000 has a high discount rate, payment in year three might be better
than payment in year five despite the $2000 haircut. Client 1000 might
prefer the bankruptcy option even if choosing it reduces the net present
value of all payments to all claimants to a level below $100 million. Other
clients might reasonably prefer the cash flow deal.
20. Erichson, supra note 9, at 30 n. 132 (quoting Richard L. Marcus, Reexamining the Bendectin
Litigation Story, 83 IOWA L. REV. 231, 252-53 (1997)).
21. Id. at 32 ("Given a situation in which any decision favors some clients' interests over others,
the sounder ethical course for the lawyer is to advance the overall interests of the group.").
22. Robert L. Dunn & Evertt P. Harry, Modeling and Discounting Future Damages, 193 J. OF
ACCOUNTANCY 4955 (2002), available at 2002 WL 11221538.
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Using an interest rate factor to inflate delayed payments would ease this
maximization conflict but not necessarily eliminate it. To see this, one need
only ask how large the factor would have to be. Discount rates are highly
subjective and hard to discover without actual choices. A lawyer negotiating
a cash flow settlement would have little chance of setting interest rates so
that all clients were indifferent as to the year in which they were paid.
The growing number of asbestos bankruptcies has brought another
maximization conflict to the fore, namely, the allocation of insolvency risks.
In the cash flow deal, clients paid in year five bore the greatest risk that the
defendant would run out of money before paying them. Rather than bear
this risk, they might have preferred a much smaller settlement in which all
clients were paid in six months. One could compensate them for the
insolvency risk by increasing their payments, but this too would be hard to
do in the absence of hard information about the likelihood of bankruptcy and
the clients' tolerances for risk.
Human psychology may also place strings on settlement dollars.
Suppose an asbestos lawyer has an opportunity to add one thousand pleural
disease cases to an existing client mix and that the expected gain on the new
cases is $250 per case. In other words, the lawyer expects to be able to give
each new client a net settlement payment of $250 after deducting fees and
costs.
In theory, a decision to accept the one thousand new cases could benefit
both the new clients and the old ones. The larger group might realize
economies of scale that the smaller groups could not separately achieve.
However, suppose that clients with pleural disease simply will not accept
$250 payments, even when told this is the expected value of their claims.
They will always go to trial unless offered at least $500 because, at lower
recovery levels, they are risk-preferring. Unfortunately, trials cost far more
than settlements, and trying the new cases would more than erase the
economies of scale.
On these assumptions, adding the new cases to the existing ones would
increase the size of the pie but would also create allocation problems. To
take advantage of the scale economies without risking an expensive trial, the
settlement would have to give the new clients at least $500 each, twice what
their claims generate in net payments. In effect, the price of the scale
economies would be a wealth transfer from the existing clients to the new
ones.
Prospect Theory, a behavioral approach to human decision making
pioneered by Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, suggests that pleural
disease claimants may be risk-preferring. "Kahneman and Tversky have
found that individuals make risk-seeking choices when selecting between
[low-probability] gains.... Thus, individuals generally prefer a 5 percent
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chance at a $1,000 prize to a certain $50 prize. ' '23 Pleural disease claimants
fit this description. They may gamble for the same reason many people buy
lottery tickets. The cost of going to trial-a missed opportunity to settle for
a small sum-is too low to make a real difference in their lives, but the
potential payoff from winning at trial or from bargaining exceptionally hard
may be large enough to matter.
Attitudes toward risk flip when, to gamble, one must wager a large
guaranteed gain. "[I]ndividuals make risk-averse choices when selecting
between [moderate-to-high probability] gains.... Thus, individuals
generally prefer a certain $500 prize to a 50 percent chance at a $1,000
prize., 24 Mesothelioma victims, asbestosis victims, and others with high
value claims are in this position. To go to trial, they must be willing to
reject settlement offers worth thousands or millions of dollars. Prospect
Theory suggests they will not take this risk, even when the odds of winning
favor them.25 Risk aversion will cause them to settle for considerably less
than the expected value of their claims.
When a litigation group containing risk-averse persons with large claims
and risk-preferring persons with small claims settles, the weak may beggar
the strong. Clients with low value claims may receive too much because
they are willing to gamble on trials, and clients with high value claims may
receive too little because they are not. The combination of risk tolerances
creates an environment in which wealth transfers are likely even if plaintiffs'
attorneys do not set out to make them. The simple desire to allocate funds
according to clients' wishes may generate wealth transfers naturally.
B. Maximization Conflicts Hidden in Stepwise Progressions
In State One, Clients A, B, and C expect recoveries of $100 apiece. In
State Two, A and B expect $100, and C expects $150. In State Three, all
three clients expect $120 apiece. Plainly, States Two and Three are Pareto-
superior to State One, meaning that a move from State One to either
alternative would make at least one client better off without harming anyone.
But neither State Two nor State Three is Pareto-superior to the other. A
move from State Two to State Three would cost Client C $30. A move from
State Three to State Two would cost Clients A and B $20 each. States Two
and Three are Pareto non-comparable even though State Three obtains the
largest total recovery ($360 > $350 > $300).
Suppose a lawyer representing all three clients can move them from
State One to State Three but can get there only via State Two. Consider an
example. At step one, the lawyer commissions a study of the etiology of
asbestos diseases. The study shows that Client C has an especially strong
claim but has no impact on the claims of Clients A or B. The first study thus
23. Chris Guthrie, Framing Frivolous Litigation: A Psychological Theory, 67 U. CHI. L. REV.
163, 166-67 (2000).
24. Id. at 167.
25. Id.
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moves the group from State One to State Two. Now suppose the lawyer
commissions a second study. It strengthens the claims of A and B but
marginally weakens the claim of C. The second study thus moves the group
from State Two to State Three. By undertaking the second study, the lawyer
increased the total return to the group but made Client C worse off.
In this example, is the maximization process harmonious? Not entirely.
The stopping point (State Three) is Pareto-superior to the starting point
(State One), but not to the way station (State Two). If asked at the start of
the case whether they preferred a move to State Three, the clients would
unanimously affirm. But the vote would not be unanimous if the clients
were asked the same question while in State Two.
This example raises interesting questions about the duty of loyalty. Did
the lawyer act to the detriment of Client C by commissioning the second
study? Or was the decision acceptable because State Three was Pareto-
superior to State One? The answer depends on whether one uses State One
or State Two as the benchmark when evaluating the decision to fund the
second study. If the duty prohibits a lawyer from doing anything that makes
a client worse off than the client was at the beginning, the decision to go
ahead with the second study is fine. If the duty prohibits a lawyer from
doing anything that makes a client worse off than the client would otherwise
have been, the decision constitutes a breach.
Lawyers frequently deploy strategies that move clients between Pareto
non-comparable states when developing groups of claims. Because the costs
and benefits of litigation services are not perfectly correlated, these steps are
inevitable. Clients sometimes pay for services that benefit others and
sometimes gain from services for which others pay. For example, in an
asbestos case, scientific evidence showing that pleural disease worsens over
time would help pleural victims by strengthening their claims to
compensation. But it would not help mesothelioma victims, mesothelioma
being a fatal disease that often kills within months of being diagnosed. If the
cost of acquiring this evidence were divided among all claimants,
mesothelioma victims would be worse off. They might make up for more
than lost ground, however, as other evidence comes in that mainly benefits
them. The point is not that mesothelioma victims (or other claimants) wind
up worse off than they begin; it is that progress from a Pareto-inferior
starting point to a Pareto-superior ending point often involves Pareto non-
comparable steps.
C. Interim Conclusion
In some respects, the process of maximizing claim values resembles that
of maximizing the value of corporate assets. Plaintiffs (shareholders) hire
lawyers (managers), give them claims (assets) to oversee, and use contingent
fees (salaries, bonuses, stock, options, etc.) to encourage them to produce
good results. The process appears to be harmonious because all plaintiffs
(shareholders) benefit when the value of claims (assets) increases.
There are, however, important differences between the two ventures.
Holders of common shares can sell when they want. Plaintiffs cannot.
Consequently, shareholders can protect themselves from maximization
conflicts better than plaintiffs. When managers incur excessive risks,
shareholders can move their money into more conservative investments.
When managers are too conservative, they can do the reverse. When
managers pass up short run opportunities in favor of long run profits,
shareholders with high discount rates can sell and investors with low
discount rates can move in. Plaintiffs, by contrast, have little recourse in
these situations. Basically, they hang on until their cases come up for trial or
settlement offers arrive.26
Shareholders also enjoy more transparency than plaintiffs. The market
produces lots of information about public companies, and the importance of
information is quickly evaluated by traders and reflected in prices. Plaintiffs
know less about their agents' day-to-day operations and cannot easily gauge
the importance of litigation events and decisions.
Finally, shareholders can limit their investments in particular companies
and diversify risks. Plaintiffs, especially those with large claims, cannot
diversify as easily. Consequently, their fortunes turn more greatly on
particular agents' decisions.
For all these reasons, maximization conflicts can matter greatly to
claimants. This is true whether claimants are involved in class actions or
consensual group lawsuits. As Professor Coffee explained when discussing
class actions:
[T]he standard conflict everyone points to first is what I will call
internal conflicts. Internal conflicts involve people who have
suffered very different injuries that can't be reliably measured ...
[I]f we are dealing with people who have a deadly injury-they're
dying of some kind of rare cancer caused by asbestos, or have just
been exposed and have mental injury and are suffering and are at
risk for future injury-it is not possible to come to any kind of
collective sense of what these injuries are. They are highly variant.
Once we have high variance within the class, we are going to have
very different attitudes towards what people want, what kind of
recovery, what kind of schedule to recoveries.27
Had one not known that Coffee's subject was the class action, one would
have thought he was discussing mass asbestos lawsuits instead. There have
been few asbestos class actions, and the source of Coffee's "internal
26. In this respect, signed asbestos clients often resemble class members. See, e.g., Bruce L.
Hay, The Theory of Fee Regulation in Class Action Settlements, 46 AM. U. L. REV. 1429, 1446
(1997) (highlighting the passive role of class members, as well as their lack of information and
authority).
27. Coffee, supra note I, at 344.
[Vol. 31: 301, 2004] Merging Roles
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
conflicts" is the nature of the injuries alleged, not the procedural vehicle
used to process claims.28 If class counsel must move ahead despite these
"internal conflicts," attorneys representing groups of signed asbestos clients
must do so as well.
This reality establishes that agency law and state bar rules tolerate
conflicts to significant degrees. The conflicts described in this section are
important, but neither body of law recognizes them or requires lawyers to
obtain conflict waivers because of them. The prevailing view is that the
project of maximizing claim values is a harmonious one in which a
plaintiffs' attorney can give multiple clients unqualified loyalty
simultaneously. This overstatement contains a large element of truth: clients
normally prefer more money to less, and most are well served by attorneys'
efforts to increase aggregate recoveries. 29 But it also sweeps some important
differences under the rug. Even though claim maximization is a promising
area for the application of traditional agency principles and state bar rules, it
often requires a lawyer for a plaintiff group to incur and resolve many
conflicts without express client consent.3 °
III. ALLOCATION CONFLICTS
In an article on class actions, Professor Bruce Hay points out that a level
contingent percentage fee arrangement-one on which every claimant pays
the same fraction of the gross recovery in fees-may encourage a plaintiff's
lawyer to maximize the recovery on a group of claims but does not motivate
a lawyer to allocate the recovery correctly (or incorrectly). 3' The lawyer is
indifferent to all possible allocations among the claimants because, on all
possible allocations, the fee remains the same.32
Indifference may not imply a lack of bias in practice, however, as
Professor Hay shows. Suppose a class contains two members, A and B, with
A's claim being worth twice as much as B's. Now suppose the class action
settles for $90. The allocation that reflects the relative value of the claims is
$60 to $30. However, class counsel is indifferent between all possible
allocations between A and B, the allocation not affecting the fee, and
decides to determine the actual allocation by lottery. Counsel writes all
possible divisions of $90, ranging from ($90, $0) to ($0, $90) on slips of
paper, places them in a box, shakes well, and draws one out. The expected
result (the average payment over repeated lotteries with replacement) is
28. Id.
29. Id. at 343.
30. Id. at 341 (stating that in a large class, it is not possible to get the individual consent of each
member).
31. Hay, supra note 26, at 1470-72.
32. Id. at 1440.
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($45, $45), i.e., an equal division. The random allocation undervalues the
larger claim and overvalues the smaller one.
One cannot remedy this problem by giving the lawyer a bonus for
payments to A. Suppose the lawyer receives a ten percent contingent fee on
payments to B and an eleven percent fee on payments to A. Now the
lawyer's incentive is to give all the money to A. The ($90, $0) allocation
yields a larger fee than any other allocation, with the smallest fee coming at
($0, $90).
Professor Hay's analysis resembles Professor Coffee's in that it applies
to mass tort lawyers as well as class counsel.33 Asbestos lawyers represent
hundreds or thousands of clients whose claims differ enormously in value.34
Clients with mesothelioma have large claims; clients with pleural disease
have small claims. In typical group representations, all clients pay the same
percentage fees. Consequently, the clients' common attorney should be
economically indifferent among all possible allocations.35 The upside of this
is that the lawyer has no incentive to prefer any claimant to any other.36 The
downside is that if lawyers chose allocation formulas at random, pleural
disease claimants will receive too much money and mesothelioma victims
will receive too little.
By themselves, then, level contingent fee arrangements do not solve
allocation problems. Other safeguards must be brought to bear if claimants
are to receive appropriate payments. The number of candidates is limited.
In class actions, they include lawyers' character, judicial monitoring,
objections from class members (or their lawyers), and opt out rights.37 In
consensual group lawsuits, they include character, complaints from clients
(and referring lawyers), settlement refusals, discharge, and malpractice suits.
Plainly, these safeguards have important effects. Settlement distributions in
class actions and mass actions differ markedly from random distributions.
Claimants with serious injuries and strong cases almost always receive more
money than claimants with minor injuries and weak cases. Dollars are not
allocated perfectly and some averaging of damages occurs, but there are
clear patterns reflecting the size and strength of claims, not random results.38
For present purposes, the tightness of the correlation between settlement
payments and claim values is not of primary concern. Of greater interest is
the inevitability of allocations and the role(s) plaintiffs' attorneys play in
their creation. Suppose, as in the preceding example, the defendant offers a
$90 lump sum settlement and the attorney for A and B recommends a ($60,
$30) distribution that reflects the relative values of the clients' claims. Did
the attorney breach a duty to either client by making the recommendation?
33. See generally Coffee, supra note 1; Hay, supra note 26.
34. See Coffee, supra note 1, at 344 (discussing variant injuries and claimants).
35. See Hay, supra note 26, at 1471.
36. Id.
37. For excellent discussions of opt out rights and other protections, see Richard Nagareda,
Autonomy, Peace, and Put Options in the Mass Tort Class Action, 115 HARV. L. REV. 747 (2002).
38. Damages averaging occurs when factors that would affect jury awards at trial are ignored in
settlement. Equal payments for all claimants result when all such factors are ignored.
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The argument for an affirmative answer is straightforward. A and B
have conflicting interests in the settlement fund. A 60-30 split is worse for
A than a 70-20 split and worse for B than a 50-40 split. A most prefers a
($90, $0) allocation and B most prefers a ($0, $90) division. Even though
the proposed ($60, $30) allocation reflects relative claim values, it sacrifices
the interests of each client for the benefit of the other, seemingly in violation
of the duty of loyalty.
The fairness of the ($60, $30) split may not nullify the violation.
Suppose it is true that A and B would have won $60 and $30 (or less),
respectively, had they sued alone. They would then be unable to show that
the ($60, $30) division harmed them. Under traditional principles of agency
law, this would doom their complaints. Nowadays, though, harm is not
always a required element of a disloyalty complaint. The Restatement
(Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers and other precedents make remedies
available, including fee forfeiture, for harmless acts of disloyalty.39
Recent developments notwithstanding, it is far from clear that a lawyer
violates the duty of loyalty by recommending a settlement allocation. The
aggregate settlement rule places no limit on a lawyer's involvement in an
allocation plan. If anything, it presupposes that a lawyer will recommend
such a plan or accede to a plan recommended by a defendant or third party,
before making the disclosures the rule requires.
Nor does other authority unambiguously forbid a lawyer from proposing
an allocation. Suppose a lawyer represents several clients injured in an
automobile accident. If the defendant's insurer offers the policy limits in
settlement of the clients' claims, may the lawyer suggest a division? The
answer should be clear, automobile accidents having been the mainstay of
the typical personal injury lawyer's practice for decades, but it is not.
A 1997 North Carolina advisory opinion allows a lawyer to recommend
a settlement allocation:
"[A] lawyer may determine that he or she will be able to facilitate
an acceptable division of the insurance proceeds among the multiple
claimants without advocating against the interests of any of the
claimants.... If an offer of settlement is made, the lawyer may
facilitate mediation among the claimants to determine how the offer
will be divided. Alternatively, the claimants may agree to accept
the recommendation of the lawyer with regard to an equitable
division of the settlement offer." 4°0  The opinion equivocates,
however, stating that "[t]he lawyer may make such a
39. See Charles Silver, A Critique of Burrow v. Arce, 26 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POLY REV.
323, 347 n.93, 348-49 (2001).
40. N.C. State. Bar, Ethics. Op. RPC 251, 1997 WL 331718 (1997) [hereinafter North Carolina
Ethics Opinion].
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recommendation only if the lawyer can do so impartially. The
lawyer must withdraw from the representation of all of the
claimants if the lawyer is placed in the role of advocate for one or
more of the claimants as against the other claimants.'
Where impartiality ends and advocacy begins the opinion does not say.
A 2000 Oregon advisory opinion comes out squarely against a lawyer's
involvement.
When resources are insufficient to cover all of the clients' damages,
the lawyer would have an "actual conflict of interest" if the lawyer
attempted to negotiate or otherwise resolve the distribution of
proceeds among the clients. Such a distribution could be
accomplished through a mediation or arbitration process established
by the lawyer. However, the lawyer cannot actively participate in
that process, other than referring the clients to the mediator or
arbitrator. 2
In Oregon, a lawyer who suggests a division of a settlement fund appears to
commit a per se violation of the conflict rules.43
The conflict between the North Carolina and Oregon opinions is
noteworthy. Both opinions were issued at the end of the 20th century, by
which time lawyers had litigated and settled hundreds of thousands or
millions of multi-client automobile cases. Even so, the opinions disagree
about the lawyer's proper role. One allows a lawyer to help the clients
divide a lump sum; the other does not. If state bar ethics committees cannot
agree on the proper course in two-client auto cases, what hope have they of
reaching a reasoned consensus on lawyers' professional responsibilities in
mass tort cases that involve enormous client groups?
To my mind, neither the Oregon opinion nor the North Carolina opinion
gets the automobile case right. Oregon's blanket prohibition denies clients
valuable information about claim values that lawyers normally provide. 44 It
forces clients to pay for information a second time (e.g., by hiring a
mediator) or to do without it. Neither option is self-evidently better than
asking the clients' joint lawyer for help, especially if and when the lawyer
has no stake in the division. Clients can waive most conflicts. There is no
obvious reason to forbid them from waiving this one.
The North Carolina opinion asserts that no conflict exists when a lawyer
makes an impartial recommendation.45 This is incorrect. Clients typically
prefer more money to less. Consequently, when settlements funds are
limited (as they always are), all recommendations embody compromises of
41. Id.
42. Or. State. Bar Ass'n, Ethics Op. 2000-158, 2000 WL 260595 (2000) [hereinafter Oregon
Ethics Opinion].
43. Id.
44. Oregon Ethics Opinion, supra note 42.
45. North Carolina Ethics Opinion, supra note 40.
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clients' competing interests, including recommendations that are impartial,
reasonable, or otherwise good. Good recommendations may be possible in
all conflict situations, yet lawyers cannot make them without obtaining
waivers.
The right answer is that lawyers always incur conflicts when
recommending settlement allocations, but that lawyers should always be
able to offer recommendations that are preceded or accompanied by
appropriate disclosures. The Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing
Lawyers seems to agree.
Lawyer represents A and B, pedestrians struck by an automobile as
they stood at a street corner. Each has sued C, the owner-driver, for
$150,000. C has $100,000 in liability insurance coverage and no
other assets with which to satisfy a judgment. Neither A nor B can
be paid the full amount of their claims and any sum recovered by
one will reduce the assets available to pay the other's claim.
Because of the conflict of interest, Lawyer can continue to represent
both A and B only with the informed consent of each.46
The example assumes the lawyer will play a role in the settlement process,
where more for one client means less for the other. If the lawyer's
engagement were limited to maximizing the recovery, no conflict would
exist, A and B having a common interest in getting the largest possible part
of C's insurance coverage.
The Restatement's position rests on an agency foundation. 47 A lawyer
must obtain an informed conflict waiver before designing a settlement
allocation because an agent may not incur a conflict without a principal's
permission. Yet, resorting to agency in this particular context is, as
Professor Coffee put it, "stuffing the square peg into the round hole., 48 A
waiver cannot eliminate, or even ameliorate, the need to compromise clients'
competing interests when allocating limited funds. It cannot free a lawyer
from having to make a contestable professional judgment. A waiver can
only establish a client's awareness and willingness to allow a lawyer to
proceed, apparently with the expectation that the lawyer will act reasonably.
In effect, an advance waiver of an allocation conflict converts a lawyer
from an agent into a trustee. Trustees are fiduciaries, yet trustees make
allocation decisions frequently. They use trust dollars to pay for Johnny's
education, knowing that fewer dollars will remain to buy Susie a new house.
"Trustees can make these [inter-beneficiary] tradeoffs even though the law
requires them to treat beneficiaries impartially. Impartiality permits trustees
46. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 128 cmt. d(i), illus. I (2000).
47. Id.
48. Coffee, supra note 1, at 341.
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to balance beneficiaries' interests as long as their decisions have reasonable
grounds. 4 9
The North Carolina advisory opinion perceives the role change but does
not fully embrace it. It allows the lawyer to recommend an allocation "if the
lawyer can do so impartially," but it draws the line when the lawyer
"advocate[s] for one or more of the claimants as against the other
claimants." When donning the trustee hat, however, the lawyer must
remove the agent hat. To recommend any allocation, a lawyer must
advocate a judgment about the clients' shares. The recommendation may be
impartial (in the sense of not being intentionally biased) and the advocacy
reasonable, but the lawyer must deviate from the agency standard of
unqualified loyalty.
To recognize the role change and embrace it is to be service-oriented
and client-focused, not unprofessional. By maximizing claim values and
recommending allocations, lawyers perform valuable services. Often, these
services involve inter-client trade-offs or accommodations.5 ° Consequently,
they do not neatly fit the model of agency law. To use this as a reason to
condemn the services or the lawyers who provide them would be wrong,
however. The point of group representations (and other collective actions) is
to help participants, not to conform to a stereotype of lawyer-client
relationships.
Lawyers' willingness to make inter-client trade-offs when representing
groups may clash with agency-based understandings of professionalism, but
what must be understood is that, in mass representations, agency has a
limited role to play. Group representations are collective actions run for the
good of all. Participants' fates intertwine, as each plaintiff depends on
others to cooperate and abide by rules.5 This cooperation involves the
sacrifice of opportunities for personal gain, as collective actions typically
do. 2 These sacrifices are predictable and beneficial responses to structural
features of group litigation.5" They are good because, without them,
litigation groups would have less chance of succeeding.
IV. GROUP DECISION MAKING
Departures from classic agency are clearest when clients in litigation
groups adopt majoritarian voting rules. A classic example can be found in
Hayes I'. Eagle-Picher Industries, Inc.,54 where the claimants established
49. Silver & Baker, supra note 7, at 1510 (citing authority).
50. Id. at 1468-69.
51. Id.
52. The economic logic of collective action dooms players who avail themselves of all
opportunities to profit, but enables players to obtain superior outcomes by binding themselves to
cooperate. See RUSSELL HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION, 20-30 (1982) (explaining that collective
action is an in-person Prisoner's Dilemma in which individually rational behavior generates
outcomes that are collectively inferior).
53. Id.
54. 513 F.2d 892 (10th Cir. 1975). I discuss this case at length in Charles Silver & Lynn A.
Baker, Mass Lawsuits and the Aggregate Settlement Rule, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 733 (1997).
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that the decision to settle as a group would be made by majority rule."
Departures also occur when clients delegate control of important decisions
to others. In Abbott v. Kidder Peabody & Co., Inc.,56 a securities lawsuit
involving more than 200 investors, the plaintiffs signed a Representation
Contract that established a "steering committee" to function as the lead
plaintiff.57  Each client authorized the lawyer to follow the steering
committee's lead when conducting his or her case. 8 Each client also agreed
to allow the lawyer to communicate with the steering committee in lieu of
communicating with each client directly.5 9 The clients selected the steering
committee's members by majority rule, with each client having a number of
votes reflecting the size of his investment. 60 The contract also contained a
"Settlement and Sharing of Proceeds" provision that (1) authorized the
lawyer to settle the claims of clients not on the steering committee on the
same terms as steering committee members received, (2) provided that any
settlement monies received by any client would be shared by the entire
plaintiff group, (3) established a formula for apportioning settlement funds
that reflected the size of each client's investment, and (4) gave the steering
committee the power to alter the formula and to enforce its will by
penalizing clients who, after joining the group, attempted to settle
separately.6'
These provisions had obvious purposes: to provide a governance
structure for collective action and to encourage cooperation so the collective
action would succeed. All joint undertakings require provisions like these.
Whenever principals join forces in pursuit of economic gain, costs must be
borne; decisions binding on all must be made; agents must be hired, given
incentives, and monitored; and returns must be allocated. The normal way
to address these needs is contractually.
Ordinarily, the law respects contractual commitments by partners in
joint undertakings to limit their control of decisions.62 It even allows
principals to renounce control entirely by becoming limited partners or
passive investors of other sorts. It does not force principals to adhere to a
normative vision of agency, but leaves them free to establish principal-agent
relationships that suit their needs best.
Laissez faire, however, does not prevail in matters of professional
responsibility. In both Hayes and Abbott, judges objected to constraints on
clients' individual control of decisions and refused to allow litigation to
55. Hayes, 513 F.2d at 892.
56. 42 F. Supp. 2d 1046 (D. Colo. 1999).




61. id. at 1048-49.
62. See Silver & Baker. supra note 1, at 1502-03.
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63proceed under restrictive agreements. In Hayes, the lawyer for the plaintiff
group consummated a settlement that a majority of the clients approved but
that a minority opposed 64 When two clients challenged the settlement on
appeal, the lawyer defended it by arguing that the disaffected clients had
agreed to be bound by majority rule.6 ' The appellate court invalidated the
settlement and found that the lawyer acted improperly.66 In its view, "the
basic fundamentals of the attorney-client relationship" prevented the lawyer
from entering into a settlement to which any client objected.67 The majority
rule agreement meant nothing because the clients did not know the terms of
the actual settlement when they entered into it.
68
In Abbott, the court faced an opposite but related problem. The
defendant objected to the governance structure the plaintiffs created for
themselves on the ground that it prevented individual plaintiffs from settling
unless the steering committee went along.69  They asked the court to
invalidate the representation contract and disqualify the plaintiffs' attorney.
70
The court left the contract standing but granted the motion to disqualify.71
The clients were free to do as they pleased, it reasoned, but the lawyer was
not.72  In the court's judgment, Colorado's conflict rule prohibited the
lawyer from continuing to represent the clients pursuant to the representation
contract.
73
To reach this conclusion, the court reasoned as follows: First, because
the client group was not a legal entity, the attorney represented each client
individually.74 The "basic fundamentals of the attorney-client relationship"
remarked on in Hayes therefore applied to the lawyer's relationship with
each client.75  Second, the representation agreement created a conflict by
empowering a minority of the clients on the steering committee to tell a
majority what to do.76 This was "far worse" than the arrangement criticized
in Hayes, which allowed a majority to control a minority. 77  Third, in
derogation of the public policy of Colorado, the representation agreement
allowed the lawyer to negotiate a settlement without advising the clients
63. See Abbott, 42 F. Supp. 2d at 1051 (applying Colorado law) ("[Alny provision of an
attorney-client agreement which deprives a client of the right to control their case is void as against
public policy."); Hayes, 513 F.2d at 894-95 ("[A]llowing the majority to govern the rights of the
minority is violative of the basic tenets of the attorney-client relationship.").
64. Hayes, 513 F.2d at 893.
65. Id. at 894-95.
66. Id. at 894.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Abbott, 42 F. Supp. 2d at 1049.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 1050-51.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 1050.
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individually and without obtaining individual authority to settle. 78 For these
reasons, the court believed, the lawyer should "have advised [the clients]
against entering into the Representation Contract because the agreement
violates the professional and ethical standards created to regulate the legal
profession in the State of Colorado. Further, valid client consent to waive
the potential conflict of interest cannot be obtained under the
circumstances. 79
Plainly, in both Hayes and Abbott, judges forced round pegs into square
holes. Instead of allowing clients to create working relationships with each
other and with lawyers that met the distinctive needs of joint representations,
they required all attorney-client relationships to conform to a Platonic ideal,
Their reasons for doing so are transparently defective. Agency law gives
principals and agents complete freedom to modify its default provisions. It
even allows them to create relationships that have the form of agency but not
the substance. These arrangements, formally called powers given as
security, are especially useful when principals must commit in advance to
cooperate in settings where incentives to defect may be strong.80 Group
lawsuits present precisely this problem of pre-commitment, as Hayes and
Abbott show. In Hayes, a small number of clients wanted to continue
litigating even though most did not." In Abbott, the defendants wanted to
reduce the group's settlement leverage by negotiating with plaintiffs
individually. 2 Both phenomena are predictable problems that cooperating
plaintiffs and their attorneys reasonably wish to deal with in advance.
The Abbott opinion is particularly disturbing, I believe, because the
clients who signed the representation agreement were investors .8  One often
hears that clients with personal injuries require a degree of paternalistic
protection, but investors-especially 200 of them-have access to the entire
legal market and are fully capable of figuring out where their interests lie.
The idea of using state bar rules to protect sophisticated clients from
themselves is a perversion that can harm clients, but is unlikely to help them.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. The points in this paragraph are fully documented and explained in a series of articles Lynn
Baker and I have written on aggregate settlements and group representations. See Charles Silver and
Lynn A Baker, Mass Lawsuits and the Aggregate Settlement Rule. 32 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 733
(1997); Charles Silver and Lynn A. Baker, I Cut, You Choose: The Role of Plaintiffs' Counsel in
Allocating Settlement Proceeds, 84 VA. L. REV. 1465 (1998); Lynn A. Baker and Charles Silver. The
Aggregate Settlement Rule and Ideals of Client Service. 41 S. TEX. L. REV. 227 (1999).
81. See Haves. 513 F.2d at 892-893.
82. See Abbott, 42 F. Supp. 2dat 1049.
83. Id. at 1048.
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V. CONCLUSION
Group representations are complicated, expensive, and risky
undertakings entered into for mutual (usually economic) gain. One should
expect their forms and governance structures to be as diverse as those that
govern partnerships, corporations, and other joint ventures. One should not
expect lawyers' roles in all group representations to be the same. Some
attorney-client relationships may give clients extensive control. Others may
narrow clients' rights and give lawyers considerable independence. No
arrangement is inherently right or inherently wrong. State bar rules that
saddle all lawyers with identical duties harm mass tort clients and others
who are jointly represented by preventing them from using legal
relationships that best suit their needs.
